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O NE of the most hallowed traditions in Anglo-American juris-
prudence is the jury system. The machinery of this great system
starts to turn each Monday morning as the clerk calls the roll of
jurors for the week. For many jurors, it is their first courthouse
experience. Some are eager to serve; others fret over the disruption
of business plans or the disturbance to their routine. For most of
them, the week's experience will be a financial sacrifice. One thing,
however, is common to all of those present: they are a captive
audience-they are present in response to the command of the law.
The judge is the one person present to whom the scene is familiar.
Continuously, he is confronted with one of the greatest opportunities
in all government to educate citizens to the gravity and the impor-
tance of administering justice. Under no other system do so many
citizens have the opportunity to become actual participants in the
judicial process, and this important fact should be communicated
to the citizens in the courtroom. The scene in the courtroom which
the judge views, however familiar and tiresome to him, should never
be taken for granted. The jurors want instructions; it is the judge
to whom they primarily look for guidance, and this is no time for
perfunctory indifferent lectures. To the contrary, the judge should
orient the jurors with their physical environment and explain to
them the nature and gravity of their week's service. Moreover, he
must strive to stimulate them to the spirit of justice according to rules
and standards of the law. To assist the judge in enlightening jurors
to their responsibilities, the State Bar of Texas authorized the dis-
tribution of jury booklets among all County Commissioners with the
request that they in turn authorize the printing of a sufficient
number for distribution among all jurors summoned in the county.
Many counties have adopted this practice, and the distribution of
such booklets has been approved by the courts.!
* Judge, San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals. B.A., Abilene Christian College; LL.B.,
University of Texas; formerly District Judge, 94th Judicial District. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Neil Weatherhogg of the Southwestern Law Journal staff
both in the preparation of the manuscript and the correlation of the footnotes.
' The State Bar of Texas published such a handbook in 1952. The information contained
therein makes a trial more understandable to jurors. The handbook provides a summary ac-
count of the historical background of the jury and designates the manner in which jurors
are chosen, the importance of government under the law, the steps in the conduct of a trial,
and the proper conduct of jurors.
' City of Dallas v. Shuford, 186 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 144 Tex. 342,
190 S.W.2d 721 (1945).
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I. STEPS IN JuRY EDUCATION
There are five logical stages of the trial when the judge may in-
struct the jurors. Brief, well-prepared instructions at each of these
stages will better educate citizens concerning a juror's duty and,
hopefully, will improve the quality of verdicts. These periods in-
clude the instructions (1) to the panel for the week; (2) before
the voir dire; (3) after a jury is sworn for a case; (4) when the case
is submitted to the jury; and (5) at the time of discharge. Each
stage calls for instructions of a different nature. If instructions are
omitted at any stage, an opportunity to comment on subjects which
are then pertinent and essential is lost. In the absence of a clear state-
ment of rules of conduct, jurors, innocently and with good inten-
tions, may violate the standards of jury conduct. It is for this reason
that the judge should instruct jurors at each stage about those matters
most likely to occur at that time. It does little good to instruct jurors
after they have acted improperly. Often, the element of repetition
in the statement of some of the standards will impress the jurors
with their importance.
A. Lecture To Jury Panel For The Week
The first opportunity to orient the jurors with the courthouse and
their expected service is presented when the jurors initially assemble.
This lecture should not be unduly long, but greater harm can come
from its being too short. It should be prepared carefully and include
comments and explanations about these subjects: (1) the nature of
their service, the cases to be heard (criminal or civil), the physical
arrangement of the courthouse, the hours of work, the time and
place to which they should report each day, and the probable length
of their service; (2) an explanation of the history and significance of
trial by jury in free nations; (3) the importance and gravity of the
jury in analyzing and deciding the facts as distinguished from the
law; and (4) a statement that all jurors-as well as judges, attorneys,
court officials, and the public-must abide by certain standards of
conduct which will be stated from time to time. The judge should
explain that jurors must possess certain qualifications.' He should
ask jurors to advise the court of any reasons which they may have
for disqualification or excuse. Furthermore, jurors should be apprised
of the legal exemptions from jury duty4 and that emergencies may
justify postponed service.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2133 (Supp. 1962).
4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2135 (Supp. 1962).
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B. Lecture Before Voir Dire
After jurors have been excused by exemption, disqualification, or
other reasons, the district court clerk prepares a list of at least twenty-
four jurors (twelve in the county court) and delivers copies to the
attorneys.' After the swearing of the jurors,' the judge should give
additional instructions covering the following subjects: (1) a brief
statement of the suit on trial, e.g., the names of the plaintiff and de-
fendant, the meaning of these terms, and the general nature of the
case; (2) an introduction to the jury of the attorneys for the parties;
(3) a statement that twelve jurors (or six) must be chosen and
that each party has the right to exercise six (or three) peremptory
challenges;' (4) an explanation that the additional questions by the
lawyers concerning the jurors' background, experience, and attitudes
are proper' and that each juror should give complete answers even
though the questions are addressed to the panel collectively; (5) an
estimate of the time required to try the case; and (6) certain rules
of proper conduct and that the jurors are free to separate at recess,
for meals, and at night provided they obey the standards of proper
jury conduct.
C. Lecture After The Jurors Are Sworn For The Case
After each party has exercised his peremptory challenges and the
clerk has called the names of the remaining jurors, the judge must
swear the jurors.! At this point, the most complete instructions should
be given the jurors concerning their own conduct. Since the true ob-
ject of the trial is to try a case properly at first rather than to remedy
an error at a subsequent time, it is better to give thorough instruc-
tions early in the trial in order to prevent possible jury misconduct.
The better practice is to give each juror a printed sheet which con-
tains the general rules of proper conduct. While the juror examines
the sheet, the judge should orally explain these rules.
D. Written Admonitory Charges
In many courts, the only admonitions given the jury are those
which are contained in the written charge. The last attempt to im-
prove upon this practice was made in 1941. At that time, Mr. Justice
Alexander distributed sample admonitory charges. Those charges
Tex. R. Civ. P. 224.
6 Tex. R. Civ. P. 226.
7Tex. R. Civ. P. 233.
'Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Terrell, 69 Tex. 650, 7 S.W. 670 (1888); Robinson v. Lovell,
238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)error ref. n.r.e.
9 Tex. R. Civ. P. 236. The judge should ask the jurors to be seated in the order called
and to use the same seats during the course of the trial.
[Vol. 18
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have fallen into disuse in many districts, probably because there was
no official sanction, although most admonitory charges have been
tested and approved. Consequently, the admonitory charges, in gen-
eral, have gradually deteriorated, and many current charges are mere
skeletons of models in use twenty years ago.
E. Lecture When Discharged
Jurors should be discharged after the judge has thanked them for
serving an important role in the judicial system. Judge Williams of
the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals suggests that comments, if appro-
priate to the case, may well be made which point out the date the
case was filed, how quickly it was tried, and the reasons for certain
delays and recesses necessary to the progress of the trial. Jurors
should be told that rule 32710 releases them from their secrecy and
that they are free to discuss the case, but are under no compul-
sion to do so. They should also be told that Texas permits investiga-
tions concerning jury misconduct." Such instructions should be
worded carefully and should not encourage the suppression of mis-
conduct proof or other error."2 It is better that these instructions
concerning the Texas law come from the judge instead of the attor-
neys. The Ethics Committee of the State Bar has had occasion to
state that certain post-trial letters from attorneys to jurors may vio-
late Canons 19, 22, 36, and 39 of the Canons of Ethics. 3 However,
other more carefully worded letters have escaped this criticism."4
In any event, the judge should assume this responsibility of further
instructing the jury. Without instructions about this law, a juror
may become indignant if one of the attorneys subsequently con-
tacts him.
II. ORAL ADMONITORY CHARGES
In the course of a trial, certain oral instructions of an admonitory or
cautionary nature are acceptable. These admonitory charges are usually
left to the discretion of the trial judge." "A judge," it has been said,
"is not required to be a speechless, mechanical robot who can speak
10 Tex. R. Civ. P. 327.
" Tumlinson v. San Antonio Brewing Ass'n, 170 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
error ref. w.o.m.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 327.
"
10'Neil v. Quilter, 236 S.W. 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
13 13 Texas B.J. at 466 (1950).
14 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Duffy, 308 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error
ref. .e.
11J.H. Robinson Truck Lines v. Ragan, 204 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Quanah, Acme & Pac. Ry. v. Eblen, 55 S.W.2d 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
1964)
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and function only if and when someone pulls the right lever."1 How-
ever, he may not assume the role of an advocate, nor may he com-
ment on the evidence. 8 Moreover, the judge should neither do nor say
anything that would indicate approval or disapproval of a plea or posi-
tion taken by any of the parties, or that he agrees or disagrees with
the evidence."' However, the judge may orally explain the align-
ment of the parties." He may also give oral admonitions against ar-
riving at a verdict by chance.2 The judge may orally admonish the
jurors to consider only the questions of law submitted to them2 and
not to separate." During the trial, the court may instruct jurors
orally to disregard improper evidence,' side-bar remarks," extraneous
matters or occurrences," and improper questions or arguments. 7 The
judge may rule orally on objections during the argument, and in the
absence of a request for a written charge, he may instruct jurors
orally that evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only." He may
order jurors to return to the jury room for further deliberations and
comment on their duty to deliberate. If jurors seek additional in-
structions, he may instruct them orally to follow the instructions
and the charge previously given." Furthermore, he may instruct the
jury orally as to the form of the verdict" and to answer as many
questions as they can agree upon. On the other hand, the court may
refuse to answer a question propounded by the jury." After the de-
liberations begin, lectures and advice to jurors" or additional instruc-
"eChavarria v. Macias, 252 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
"
7 Hudson v. Hudson, 308 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
'8Tex. R. Civ. P. 272; 20 Texas L. Rev. 83 (1941).
"For an excellent discussion of the role of the judge, see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Murphy,
46 Tex. 356 (1876).
2Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Wallace & Co., 263 S.W. 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
" Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Davis, 19 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.
22 Luse v. Beard, 252 S.W. 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error dism.
"Mahaney v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 443, 254 S.W. 946 (1923).
"Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Whitcomb, 139 Tex. 467, 163 S.W.2d 616 (1942).
"'Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Helton, 145 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dism., jiudgm. cor.
'Bell v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 120 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
2 Browning v. Nesting, 219 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
" Anderson v. Barnwell, 52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 86 S.W.2d 41
(Tex. Comm. App. 1935).
9Hunt v. Johnson, 141 S.W. 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) error dism. w.o.j., 106 Tex.
509, 171 S.W. 1125 (1914).
3Kuykendall v. Johnson Funeral Parlor, 38 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Gill-
ham v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 241 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.
" Tyer v. Timpson Handle Co., 135 S.W. 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
"' Varn v. Gonzales, 193 S.W. 1132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), rev'd on other grounds, 222
S.W. 543 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
as F. H. Vahlsing v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
error dism.; Compton v. Jennings Lumber Co., 295 S.W. 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error
dism.; Moore v. Thomas, 258 S.W. 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
34 Ibid.
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tions on the law which should be in writing" may be coercive unless
the statements are carefully limited. Instructions about the burden of
proof should not be oral."6 Jurors should not be admonished to make
concessions during their deliberations." During the trial and even
after deliberations commence, the judge may recess the jurors orally.
At such time, he may instruct them, in fact he should, concerning
their conduct during periods of separation." The judge may receive
the verdict from the jury orally,"9 and he may poll them orally.'
III. APPROVED WRITTEN ADMONITORY CHARGES
Except for matters of admonition and administration, instructions
should be in writing."' This also applies to definitions and instructions
about legal terms, although a few clear and simple oral instructions
have been permitted. " As a part of the court's formal written charge,
it is the standard Texas procedure to give certain written admoni-
tions. Some of these instructions are very old and have been approved
in decided cases, but the experience of many years shows the need to
add additional instructions. The following are suggested instructions
that have been tested and approved:
(1) Matters of fact: You are the sole judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, but in
matters of law, you must be governed by the instructions in this
charge."'
(2) Special issues: This case is submitted to you upon the follow-
ing special issues which you will answer, without regard to the effect
your answers may have upon the judgment in this case or the parties
to the suit."
(3) Disinterest: Do not let bias, prejudice, sympathy, resentment,
or any such emotion play any part in your deliberations.'
(4) No communication: Hold yourselves completely aloof from
the lawyers, witnesses, parties, and all other persons concerned with
15 Ibid.
"0 Reed v. Bates, 32 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
37Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Johnson, 99 Tex. 337, 90 S.W. 164 (1905).
3" Tex. R. Civ. P. 284.
" Tex. R. Civ. P. 293.
40 Tex. R. Civ. P. 294.
41 Tex. R. Civ. P. 271, 272.
42 See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
"'Dickinson v. Sanders, 39 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); International & G.N.
R.R. v. Muschamp, 90 S.W. 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error ref.; Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry.
v. Bunrock, 46 S.W. 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) error ref.; Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Davis,
23 S.W. 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
"Imperial Underwriters v. Dillard, 146 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.;
9 Stayton, Texas Forms § 5091 (Rev. ed. 1961).4
' Throckmorton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 39 S.W. 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref.
1964]
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this suit." Do not discuss this case with anyone or even mention it to
other persons, and do not permit anyone to mention it in your hearing
while this case is on trial. That means that you will not discuss the
case even with your wife or husband."
(5) No speculation: Do not speculate on matters not shown by
the evidence and about which you are not asked any questions. Re-
member that you cannot guess your way to a just and correct ver-
dict.4
8
(6) Do not visit scene: Do not go out to the scene of any occur-
rence to make personal inspections, observations, or investigations. If
you conduct a personal view of the premises or of things and articles
which are not produced in open court, you will violate your oath and
your duty as jurors."'
(7) Personal knowledge: Be very careful not to consider or men-
tion any personal knowledge or information you may have about any
fact or person which is not shown by the evidence you have heard
in this trial. Do not try to gather any evidence for yourselves. Your
duty is to answer these questions from the evidence you have heard
here and from that alone."'
(8)Verdict by lot or chance: Do not try to reach a verdict by
lot or chance and do not return a quotient verdict by adding together
figures, dividing by the number of jurors, and agreeing to be bound
by the result. Do not do any trading on your answers-that is, some
of you agreeing to answer certain questions one way if others will
agree to answer other questions another way. All questions must be
answered by a unanimous vote and not by a majority vote."
(9) Effect of answers to special issues: Do not decide who you
think should win, and then try to answer the questions accordingly.
If you do that, your verdict will be worthless and all of our time will
46 Tex. R. Civ. P. 284.
4
, Ibid.
48 Ford Motor Co. v. Whitt, 81 S.W.2d 1032 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error ref.; Taylor
v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 67 S.W.2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), rev'd on other
grounds, 128 Tex. 118, 96 S.W.2d 70 (1936); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Callahan, 51
S.W.2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 125 Tex. 222, 81 S.W.2d 504 (1935); Dickin-
son v. Sanders, 39 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. v. Allen,
296 S.W. 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism. Such a charge was not objectionable on
the grounds that it deprived a jury of the right to consider matters of common knowledge.
Petroleum Producers Co. v. Stolley, 137 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
dism., judgm. cor.
4Southern Traction Co. v. Wilson, 254 S.W. 1104 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); see also
Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Davis, 19 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.
" Taylor v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 67 S.W.2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933),
rev'd on other grounds, 128 Tex. 118, 96 S.W.2d 70 (1936); International Harvester Co.
v. Campbell, 96 S.W. 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
"1Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Roys, 281 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error
ref. n.r.e.; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Dickey, 70 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.;
Reed v. Bates, 32 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
[Vol. 18
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have been wasted. Simply answer the questions as you find the facts
from the evidence without concerning yourselves about the effect of
your answers.
5
(10) Attorney's fees and cost of litigation: You must not con-
sider, discuss, or refer in your deliberations to attorney fees. You
will not allow any recovery therefor or for costs of litigation, and
you will not take these matters into consideration."
IV. DISAPPROVED ADMONITORY CHARGES
Although the courts have been liberal in permitting admonitions
about conduct, they have neither encouraged nor often permitted
instructions that tell jurors what they may consider in arriving at
their verdict. Instructions that jurors may consider common knowl-
edge are discouraged." The same may be said about instructions that
jurors may consider circumstantial evidence." Ordinarily, courts do
not instruct jurors that they should not consider whether any party
does or does not have insurance coverage."
5 Turner v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 77 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error dism.
53Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Dickey, 70 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.;
Reed v. Bates, 32 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v.
Davis, 19 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.; St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. v. Allen,
296 S.W. 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.; Northern Tex. Traction Co. v. Woodall,
294 S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 299 S.W. 220 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1927).
"Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Tips, 125 Tex. 69, 81 S.W.2d 60 (1935); Becker v. Mollenauer,
234 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; Kid v. Mahan, 214 S.W.2d 865
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, 197
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), aft'd, 145 Tex. 571, 200 S.W.2d 624 (1947), noted
in 26 Texas L. Rev. 89 (1947); Petroleum Producers Co. v. Stolley, 137 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judgm. cor.; St. Louis, B & M. Ry. v. Zamora, 110 S.W.2d
1242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
" Johnson v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 232, 205 S.W.2d 353 (1947),
noted in 26 Texas L. Rev. 814 (1948); Nass v. Nass, 224 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949), aff'd, 149 Tex. 41, 228 S.W.2d 130 (1950).
5 In Lucas v. Alsmeyer, 322 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), a juror approached
the judge in course of a trial and asked: "Judge, can't this boy's liability insurance company
help him out of this some way or other?" The court then gave this instruction to the
whole jury:
I especially remind and instruct you that this suit is between the individual
parties before you, to-wit, Benjamin D. Lucas and wife, Valita Lucas, as
Plaintiffs, and Charles R. Alsmeyer, as the Defendant, and none other than said
above-named parties. There is no evidence before you as to whether either
party to this suit has or had liability or any other kind of insurance; nor is
this a matter within your province as jurors to consider one way or the other,
and on this you must not guess or speculate, nor discuss, mention or consider.
It is, therefore, imperative that all times during this trial and during your
deliberations on your verdict that you bear in mind that the above named
Plaintiffs and Defendant are the only parties to this suit, and you must not
mention, discuss, or consider, by mental reservation or otherwise, whether
either party to this suit is covered by insurance of any kind whatsoever, and
in awarding damages, if any, you must not consider that any amount, if any,
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An admonition which has been criticized is one that induces jurors
to conceal their misconduct. Suppression of misconduct by the court
or attorneys is misconduct." In O'Neil v. Quilter," the judge in-
structed the jury:
Gentlemen of the panel for the week, the court instructs you that
in all cases which have or may be submitted to you during the week,
that after a verdict has been rendered by you in such case, you shall
not converse with or make any statements to any of the parties, or
their attorneys, or any one else, as to how, or in what manner, or by
what means, you arrived at a verdict, or state anything that transpired
among the jury while deliberating on your verdict therein.
The reason for the above instruction is that, if any such information
is given by any of you, it is possible that, based upon such information,
this court will be compelled to set aside your verdict on a motion for
new trial urged by the losing party.'"
The instructions were condemned severely, but there was no reversal
since the aggrieved party made no effort to investigate any acts of
misconduct. Counsel's explanation that he feared he would be fined
for contempt if he undertook an investigation did not excuse his
failure to prove suppression in fact. Justice would have been better
served if the judge had explained that the jury was released from
secrecy and that they were free to discuss the case if they so desired.
V. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JUDGE AND JURY
A. In General
The proper rule is for a judge to refuse to communicate with
jurors, either individually or collectively, except in open court and
strictly in the manner stated by the rules. Rules 285 and 286 gen-
erally set forth the procedure to be followed in communications be-
tween judge and jury in civil cases:
Rule 285. Jury May Communicate with Court:
The jury may communicate with the court by making their wish
known to the officer in charge, who shall inform the court, and they
may then in open court, and through their foreman, communicate with
the court, either verbally or in writing. If the communication is to
request further instructions, Rule 286 shall be followed."
so awarded will be adjudged against anyone except the defendant, Charles
Alsmeyer. Id. at 20-21.
Although there was a waiver of the point because there was no motion for mistrial, the
court said the charge was proper and timely given, since one of the jurors had already
raised the question of insurance.
"' Goldstein Hat Mfg. Co. v. Cowen, 136 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dism.; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 94 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) rev'd
mem.
5 O'Neil v. Quilter, 236 S.W. 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
"id. at 119.
8°Tex. R. Civ. P. 285.
[Vol. 18
1964] THE JUDGE-JURY RELATIONSHIP
Rule 286. Jury May Receive Further Instructions:
After having retired, the jury may receive further instructions of the
court touching any matter of law, either at their request or upon the
court's own motion. For this purpose they shall appear before the judge
in open court in a body, and if the instruction is being given at their
request, they shall through their foreman state to the court, in writing,
the particular question of law upon which they desire further instruc-
tion. The court shall give such instruction in writing, but no instruc-
tion shall be given except in conformity with the rules relating to the
charge. Additional argument may be allowed in the discretion of the
court.6 '
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, the
statutese2 were construed strictly, and almost any communication be-
tween the judge and jury which was not in open court or which was
otherwise in violation of the rules resulted in a reversal."3 In this area
of communications between judge and jury, perhaps the greatest
changes have been affected by the harmless error rules.6 4 The rule of
presumed harm, which was often construed to mean conclusive harm,
was changed" to a rule that the complainant must, as in other cases,
prove harm."6 However, conduct which is harmless may nevertheless
be improper, and the careful judge will avoid every charge of im-
"
1 Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
62Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2197 (1925) is the source of Rule 285, and Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2198 (1925) is the source of Rule 286.
63Houston Elec. Co. v. Lee, 139 Tex. 166, 162 S.W.2d 692 (1942); see also Houston
Elec. Co. v. MeLeroy, 139 Tex. 170, 163 S.W.2d 1062 (1942); Scroggs v. Morgan, 133
Tex. 581, 130 S.W.2d 282 (1939); Texas Midland R.R. v. Byrd, 102 Tex. 263, 115 S.W.
1163 (1909); Gerneth v. Galbraith Foxworth Lumber Co., 38 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1931); Corn v. Crosby County Cattle Co., 25 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930);
Parker v. Bailey, 15 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929); Kuhn v. Palo Duro Corp.,
151 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd and dism., 139 Tex. 125, 161 S.W.2d 778
(1942); Neely v. Woolley, 143 S.W.2d 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Reynolds v. Sandel,
142 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Belser v. Achley, 57 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933); City of Waco v. Craven, 54 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Millerman v.
Houston & T.C.R.R., 27 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.; Lorenzen v. Keenan,
266 S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Smith v. Harris, 252 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923). At least one case decided under the former statute (article 2198) did require
a showing of prejudice (Whitaker v. Browning, 155 S.W. 1197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
error ref.), but this case, in effect, was overruled by Parker v. Bailey, supra.
"
4 Tex. R. Civ. P. 434, 503.
6 This new interpretation emerged in 1945. Denbow v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 143
Tex. 455, 186 S.W.2d 236 (1945); Onion, Judge & Jury in the State Courts, in Personal
Injury Litigation in Texas 417, 428 (1961).
6" Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954); Foreman
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 468, 241 S.W.2d 977 (1951); Denbow v. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co., supra note 65; Travis-Williamson County Water Control & Improvement
Dist. No. I v. Page, 358 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), modified, - Tex. -, 367
S.W.2d 307 (1963); Brown v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 294 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Whelan v. State, 271 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 155 Tex. 14, 282 S.W.2d 378 (1955); see also Anuot., 41 A.L.R.2d 288,
306-07 (1955).
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proper communications by avoiding contacts and conversations with
jurors.
B. Additional Instructions
After the original charge is read" and the jurors begin their deli-
beration, it is not unusual that additional instructions are requested.
Rules 286 ss and 295"B contemplate and authorize additional instruc-
tions. If the judge independently determines that an additional in-
struction should be given, he may either give an additional charge or
withdraw one that he deems in error. ' Less frequently, attorneys
originate the request for an amended or altered charge.1 Moreover,
it is not uncommon for jurors to request the court to give them addi-
tional instructions or information." The request from the jurors, if
it pertains to matters of additional instruction, should be in writing
in conformity with rule 286 .7 Additional instructions are generally
left to the discretion of the judge.' However, not every communica-
tion between judge and jury is termed a giving of further instruc-
tions. Reading a part of the charge which has previously been sub-
mitted" or advising the jury to answer such issues as they can agree
upon is not an additional instruction."
Many situations may arise during trial that will justify additional
admonitory charges.7 Matters concerning the health and comfort of
07 Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 requires that the original charge be in writing.
es Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
69 Tex. R. Civ. P. 295.
70Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 138 Tex. 523, 161 S.W.2d 484 (1942); Jas. A.
Dick Co. v. Yanez, 55 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.; Goode v. Ramey, 48
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.; Mulligan v. McConnell Bros., 242 S.W. 512
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Cheek v. W.H. Nicholson & Co., 146 S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) error ref. This was the law prior to the adoption of the Rules. Now, Tex. R. Civ.
P. 286 specifically provides: "[T]he jury may receive further instructions of the court . . .
upon the court's own motion."
71 Gotoskey v. Grawunder, 158 S.W. 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
7' Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954); Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Starling, 130 Tex. 379, 110 S.W.2d 557 (1937); Miller v. Jones,
270 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Neely v. Wooley, 143 S.W.2d
1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); F.H. Vahlsing, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d
947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Gillham v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 241 S.W.
512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.; Hermann v. Schroeder, 175 S.W. 788 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915).
7
'Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
"4Compare Mulligan v. McConnell Bros., 242 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), uitb
Oates v. Maxcy, 206 S.W. 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
" Kuykendall v. Johnson Funeral Parlor, 38 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
7" Varn v. Gonzales, 193 S.W. 1132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), rev'd on other grounds, 222
S.W. 543 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920).
7'In Bell v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 120 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), it was
proper for the judge to give an oral instruction to the jury that they may disregard
statements made to them by one who had intruded in the jury room. A juror who, during
recess, asked the judge about insurance coverage gave rise to an excellent charge to the
jury. See note 56 suyra.
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the jury are common matters of oral advice from the court."8 Further-
more, the court may need to withdraw or correct an erroneous charge,
to make an additional charge, 8 to instruct the jury to disregard an
issue,"0 or to correct clerical and typographical errors." Conflicts in
the answers to special issues often require further instructions." Before
the verdict is returned, a jury may inquire about possible conflicts."3
The court should check the verdict with possible conflicts in mind
prior to discharging the jury. If conflicts are indicated, the judge
should point out the conflicts and return the jury for further delibera-
tion."
C. Proper Procedure For Communications Between Judge And Jury
1. In Open Court Rules 2858" and 2868 state that communications
between the judge and jury should be in open court. Problems may
arise if there are private conferences between separated jurors and the
judge," if the judge enters the jury room," or if the judge and jury
communicate by messages." Especially is this true if any of the afore-
mentioned communications are not in open court or outside the
presence of counsel. Although these practices may not constitute
78Prescott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 129 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
error dism.
78 Boler v. Coughran, 304 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.; Goode v. Ramey,
48 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.; Cheek v. W.H. Nicholson & Co., 146
S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.; Martin, Moodie & Co. v. Petty, 79 S.W. 878
(Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Yoakum v. Mettasch, 26 S.W. 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894)
error ref.8
°Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 269 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), rev'd
on other grounds, 154 Tex. 424, 279 S.W.2d 299 (1955).
81Boler v. Coughran, 304 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.
8" Tex. R. Civ. P. 295.
8' Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Starling, 130 Tex. 379, 110 S.W.2d 557 (1937).
"Denbow v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 455, 186 S.W.2d 236 (1945); Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 138 Tex. 523, 161 S.W.2d 484 (1942); City of Dallas v.
Riddle, 325 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Burnett v. Rutledge, 284
S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Johnson, 275 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Pantazis v. Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co., 162 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism.; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
v. Boyd, 146 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 295; 41-B
Tex. Jur. Trial - Civil Cases §§ 363-68, 573-79 (1953).
" Tex. R. Civ. P. 285.
"Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
87 The judge standing in the court room with a door opened to the jurors in the jury
room was "open court." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Short, 62 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
error ref.; Compton v. Jennings Lumber Co., 295 S.W. 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error
dism.; Wichita Falls Compress Co. v. W.L. Moody & Co., 154 S.W. 1032 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) error dism. Contra, Scroggs v. Morgan, 133 Tex. 581, 130 S.W.2d 283 (1939);
Lorenzen v. Keenan, 266 S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See also Gillham v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 241 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.
88 Parker v. Bailey, 15 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
8" Houston Elec. Co. v. Lee, 139 Tex. 166, 162 S.W.2d 692 (1942).
"°Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954).
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the harmful error," they are irregular. All judicial comments, how-
ever short and harmless, should be made in open court.
2. In a Body Rule 2862 also contemplates that instructions shall be
given directly to all jurors. Although private conferences are dis-
couraged, 2 harmful error must be proven for reversal. 4 There are
good reasons why all instructions should be given collectively to the
jurors. Privately communicated instructions may be misunderstood;
they may be reported erroneously; or they may not be reported at
all."5 Furthermore, the judge should require that all private inquiries
from jurors be put in writing." In the Ross case," a lone juror's mis-
conduct gave impetus to the harmless error rule in an area which
theretofore had required strict adherence to principles of propriety.
The instruction in that case was admonitory in nature and should
not have been disclosed to other jurors. It was, in fact, a matter which
properly should have been handled privately, so that one juror's
impending misconduct would not affect the other jurors. Although
proof of harm must now be shown, nevertheless, it is improper to give
instructions about applicable law to separated jurors.9 However, the
error may be waived if counsel knows of the private communication
and does not take action.
3. In Conformity With The Rules Jurors often initiate an inquiry
to the court by oral communications to the bailiff or judge."° The
court should require, however, that any requests for instructions be
" Ibid. Prior to the 1941 Rules, it would have been prejudicial. Texas Midland Ry. v.
Byrd, 102 Tex. 263, 115 S.W. 1163 (1909); Corn v. Crosby County Cattle Co., 25
S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930); Parker v. Bailey, 15 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1929); Kuhn v. Palo Duro Corp., 151 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd
and dism., 139 Tex. 125, 161 S.W.2d 778 (1942); Belser v. Achley, 57 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933); Millerman v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 27 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) error ref.; The error was waived in White v. Haynes, 60 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) error dism. Undisclosed discussions between judge and jury should not occur.
Smith v. Harris, 252 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
O9 Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
" Parker v. Bailey, 15 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
"Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954).
" Millerman v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 27 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
" Brown v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry., 294 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error
ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957).
" Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954).
9 Belser v. Achley, 57 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Humble Pipe Line Co. v.
Kincaid, 19 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error 'ef.; Holman Bros. v. Cusenbary,
225 S.W. 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error dism.; Corpus Christi St. & Interurban Ry. v.
Kjellberg, 185 S.W. 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
"Lucas v. Alsmeyer, 322 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); White v. Haynes, 60
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.; Ineeda Laundry v. Newton, 33 S.W.2d
208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.; Carter v. Guaranty State Bank, 262 S.W. 108
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Gillham v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 241 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922) error dism.
'"Tex. R. Civ. P. 285.
1964] THE JUDGE-JURY RELATIONSHIP
put in writing."1 The parties have the right to demand that additions
and deletions from the original charge also be made in writing. The
irregularity of giving oral instead of written instructions, like other
improper communications, may be waived by inaction."'
Rule 286,03 which states that additional instruction will be in
conformity with the rules relating to the charge, accords counsel the
right to object to additional instructions concerning the charge."'
In order to constitute reversible error, counsel must prove probable
harm.0 Counsel may waive the error by joining therein or by know-
ingly remaining silent."' Therefore, counsel who wishes to preserve
any error would be well advised to remain accessable to the court
while the jury is deliberating."'
D. Coercion
Jurors should render a verdict in accordance with what their re-
spective judgments lead them to believe is the truth. What con-
victions a juror may surrender consistent with an intelligent and
conscientious discharge of his duty is for him alone to determine. It
is his judgment that the law seeks to obtain, and he should be left to
form it uninfluenced by coercive advice from the court or any other
person."' Most coercion results from judicial lectures or from re-
'0' Tex. R. Civ. P. 286. See also note 72 supra and accompanying text.
'°' Peters v. Gilland, 186 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.; Vahlsing, Inc.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Carter v.
Guaranty State Bank, 262 S.W. 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'03 Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
14 Scroggs v. Morgan, 133 Tex. 581, 130 S.W.2d 282 (1939); Ft. Worth Structural
Steel Co. v. Griffin, 63 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Meinecke v. Fidelity Inv. Co.,
62 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref.; Stolz v. Wells, 43 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931); Thompson v. Caldwell, 22 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd,
36 S.W.2d 999 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Bryan, 15 S.W.2d 1098
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Hickman v. Talley, 8 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Corpus
Christi St. & Interurban Ry. v. Kjellberg, 185 S.W. 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). See also
Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 138 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism.
"'Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954).
'0o White v. Haynes, 60 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.; Ineeda Laundry
v. Newton, 33 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.; Carter v. Guaranty State
Bank, 262 S.W. 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Gillham v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 241
S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.; Oates v. Maxcy, 206 S.W. 535 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918).
'°7Moore v. Jordan, 328 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Gideon, 213 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Pantazis v. Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co., 162 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism.; Kuykendall v. Johnson
Funeral Parlor, 38 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Martin,
32 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.; Cheek v. W.H. Nicholson & Co., 146
S.W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.; cf. Hickman v. Talley, 8 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
'0' Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Johnson, 99 Tex. 337, 90 S.W. 164 (1905); Reed v. Bates, 32
S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 229, 250 (1955); Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 1257 (1951); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 72 (1937); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1420 (1933);
53 Am. Jur. Trial §§ 150-64, 905 (1945); 41-B Tex. Jur. Trial-Civil Cases § 328 (1953);
3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 14.03, at 1227 (1950).
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marks made by others on behalf of the judge. Jurors should never
be advised to compromise their convictions,.. and coercion has re-
sulted from statements by judges that a minority should yield to a
strong majority1 ' or that the case would probably be appealed in any
event."' The judge should never minimize the significance of the
case by stating that the case is only a civil suit which involves dollars
and cents. ' Comments about the cost, expense, or waste incident to
a new trial are also coercive." To force a verdict either by threats to
hold jurors together for extended periods of time under difficult
circumstances or by actually holding them together for an un-
reasonably long time may result in coercion."' It was so held when a
judge advised the jurors that he would hold them "until next Satur-
day night,"'11. which was a week away. It was coercion for a judge
to tell the jury that it was his practice not to discharge a jury until
a verdict was received.1 . and also for a judge to tell the jurors that he
would hold them to the end of the term. 1'
A judge does not have to discharge a jury if they request it. More-
over, the jury may be held together for extended periods of time if
coercion is not present. Some cases-by reason of their complexity,
the number of witnesses and issues, and the length of the trial-
justify extended deliberation. It is not coercive to send jurors back
several times for further deliberations; this is so although they report
that they are hopelessly deadlocked.1 A jocular remark to a jury that
'0 Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Johnson, supra note 108; Reed v. Bates, supra note 108;
Pecos & N.T. Ry. v. Finklea, 155 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Cornelison v. Ft.
Worth & R.G. Ry., 103 S.W. 1186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Texas Midland Ry. v. Byrd,
90 S.W. 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905); 30 Texas L. Rev. 642 (1952).
'"0 Sargent v. Lawrence, 40 S.W. 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
... Sunshine Oil Corp. v. Randals, 226 S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error dism.
But see Renn v. Samos, 42 Tex. 104 (1875).
"'Texas Cent. Ry. v. Driver, 187 S.W. 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
"'Texas Midland Ry. v. Brown, 228 S.W. 915 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921); Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. v. Barber, 209 S.W. 394 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919); Cloudt v. Hutcherson,
175 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; Baldwin v. Morton, 19 S.W.2d 948
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Sunshine Oil Corp. v. Randals, 226 S.W. 1090 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921); Cornelison v. Ft. Worth & R.G. Ry., 103 S.W. 1186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
Wootan v. Partridge, 87 S.W. 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905); cf. Fleck v. Missouri, K. & T.
Ry., 191 S.W. 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
1 4 Hunter v. Hunter, 187 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error dism.; Pecos & N.T.
Ry. v. Finklea, 155 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); North Dallas Circuit Ry. v. McCue,
35 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). For an example of coercion from one other than
a judge, see State v. Black, 14 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
.. Hunter v. Hunter, supra note 114, at 1050.
11Texas Midland Ry. v. Brown, 228 S.W. 915, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
".'North Dallas Circuit Ry. v. McCue, 35 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). Contra,
Burgess v. Singer Mfg. Co., 30 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
"' Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error
ref. n.r.e.; Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Webster, 185 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref.; Pantazis v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 162 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)
error dism.; Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Horton, 119 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
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they had "the whole world to agree on and the whole week before
[them]" was regarded as harmless.11 ' The judge may inquire in open
court about the progress of the jurors." However, to avoid the
charge of coercion, it is better for the judge to make his inquiries
through the foreman.'21 If the verdict is incomplete or conflicting, the
judge should return the jury for further deliberation, and to do so
is not coercion."' Coercion by the judge may be waived if counsel
does not preserve the error."
E. Reproduction Of Evidence
A request for reproduction of evidence, in proper circumstances, is
a legitimate communication between judge and jury.'2 Rule 287125
provides as follows:
If the jury disagree as to the statement of any witness, they may, upon
applying to the court, have read to them from the court reporter's
notes that part of such witness' testimony on the point in dispute;
but if there be no such reporter, or if his notes cannot be read to the
jury, the court may cause such witness to be again brought upon the
stand and the judge shall direct him to repeat his testimony as to the
point in dispute, and no other, as nearly as he can in the language used
on the trial; and on their notifying the court that they disagree as to
any portion of a deposition or other paper not permitted to be carried
with them in their retirement, the court may, in like manner, permit
such portion of said deposition or paper to be again read to the jury.
This rule is said to be a "safeguard" against jury misconduct. ' How-
ever, elicitation of new evidence is outside the purpose of the rule.
The reproduction of evidence is said to be within the discretion of
the trial court."" Even though a jury may be in disagreement about
the evidence, the court may in the exercise of a sound judicial dis-
cretion decline a request that the evidence be reproduced for them."'
error dism.; Northern Tex. Traction Co. v. Brigance, 128 S.W. 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910);
Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Darwin, 105 S.W. 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.
.19 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Oakley, 181 S.W. 506, 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).12 Foreman v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 468, 241 S.W.2d 977 (1951).
121 Ibid.
... Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 856 (1954); Pantazis v. Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co., 162 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error dism.
" Renn v. Samos, 42 Tex. 104 (1875); Cloudt v. Hutcherson, 175 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; Hunter v. Hunter, 187 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
error. dism.
124 Tex. R. Civ. P. 287.
125 Ibid.
" Burkett v. Slauson, 150 Tex. 69, 237 S.W.2d 253, 255 (1951).
11 J.H. Robinson Truck Lines v. Ragan, 204 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Standard Supply & Hardware Co. v. Christian-Carpenter Drilling Co., 183 S.W.2d 657




F. Disclosing The State Of Deliberations
Jurors should not disclose the state of their deliberations before
they return their verdict."' Rule 283 states that the officer in charge
should not, prior to rendition of the verdict, communicate to any-
one the state of the deliberations or the verdict agreed upon."'0 The
rule also applies to judges."' The judge should not ask each juror
individually if he believes that the jury will be able to reach a verdict,
nor should he send for the charge or the jury's worksheet for per-
sonal examination."' Moreover, the judge may not ask the individual
jurors what they think about the verdict itself."'
There are limited inquiries which may be made of a jury, however.
Rule 283 permits the officer attending the jury to inquire if they
have agreed upon a verdict."4 The judge or the bailiff acting for the
judge may also determine that fact."' The correct procedure is for
the judge to call the jury into open court and to ask the foreman if
they have reached a verdict."' The judge may also inquire if the jury
is making any progress, if it appears that they will be able to reach
a verdict, and if the jury can estimate how much more time will
be required."' A judge who proceeds cautiously and carefully may
take still a further step. It is better, however, to take the step only
with consent of all counsel and after cautioning the jury that they
must neither state how they stand on specific issues nor state how
many are for the plaintiff and defendant. Having so advised the
jury, the judge may then ask how they stand numerically.
Situations sometimes develop by which the judge, parties, and
attorneys may discover how a jury stands on the issues. Notes from
jurors may indicate the state of their deliberations; this is usually con-
sidered harmless." Often, jurors will return a partial verdict, and
29 Tex. R. Civ. P. 283.
"s0 Ibid.
a' Houston Elec. Co. v. McLeroy, 139 Tex. 170, 163 S.W.2d 1062 (1942); Houston
Elec. Co. v. Lee, 139 Tex. 166, 162 S.W.2d 692 (1942); Burnett v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d
944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Currie v. Smith, 184 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) error ref. wo.m.; Bailiff's misconduct: Willis v. Goodrum, 360 S.W.2d 182
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962) error ref. n.r.e. Party's misconduct: Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Perez,
360 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
"'Currie v. Smith, 184 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.; Houston
Elec. Co. v. McLeroy, supra note 131; Houston Elec. Co. v. Lee, supra note 131.
"'Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
34 Tex. R. Civ. P. 283.
" Union City Transfer v. Adams, 248 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
n.r.e., cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953); 41-B Tex. Jur. Trial -Civil Cases § 315 (1953).
" Foreman v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 468, 473, 241 S.W.2d 977, 979
(1951).
' See Foreman v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, supra note 136; Callahan v. Hester, 181
S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. wo.m.
" Burnett v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. M.r.e.; Coils
v. Price's Creameries, Inc., 244 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
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the judge may direct them to resume deliberations.13 The rule against
disclosing the state of deliberations must also be read in connection
with rules 286'.. and 295141 because situations may arise which require
additional instructions after the jury has returned-the verdict may
be defective or may contain conflicting answers. The problem of dis-
closure is apparent. The judge should point out the defects or con-
flicts and return the jury for further deliberations. 4 ' The same rule
applies if the foreman fails to sign the verdict.'43
G. Separation Of Jurors
Rule 282 provides that the jury should be kept together:
The jury may either decide a case in court or retire for deliberation.
If they retire, they shall be kept together in some convenient place,
under the charge of an officer, until they agree upon a verdict or are
discharged by the court; but the court in its discretion may permit
them to separate temporarily for the night and at their meals, and for
other proper purposes.'"
"If permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is
submitted to them, the jury shall be admonished by the court that
it is their duty not to converse with, or permit themselves to be
addressed by any other person, on any subject, connected with the
trial.'..'. In civil cases, jurors are usually permitted to separate during
recesses, for meals, and at night.'46 The trial judge has considerable
discretion concerning the separation of jurors both during the trial
and after a cause is submitted to them. 4 " A separation of a jury for
a period of five days was held to be a proper exercise of discretion.4"
Even though there is an objection to the separation, the court may
permit it.'49 A separation without permission is harmless in itself,
"3 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 209 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error
ref. n.r.e.
'"Tex. R. Civ. P. 286.
141 Tex. R. Civ. P. 295.
142 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 138 Tex. 523, 161 S.W.2d 484 (1942).
'4Burnett v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
144 Tex. R. Civ. P. 282; Union City Transfer v. Adams, 248 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952) error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953).
143 Tex. R. Civ. P. 284. This procedure was cited as a safeguard against jury mis-
conduct in Burkett v. Slauson, 150 Tex. 69, 237 S.W.2d 253 (1951).
1Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 138 Tex. 523, 161 S.W.2d 484 (1942).
147San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Bennett, 76 Tex. 151, 13 S.W. 319 (1890); Noel v.
Denman, 76 Tex. 306, 13 S.W. 318 (1890); International & G.N.R.R. v. McVey, 102
S.W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.; 53 Am. Jur. Trial §§ 861-65 (1945); 41-B
Tex. Jur. Trial - Civil Cases § 303 (1953). By amendment of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts.
2133, 2135 (Supp. 1962), women serve as jurors in Texas. Of necessity, there must be
periods of separation of the men and women. See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 68 (1931).
14SKothman v. Faseler, 84 S.W. 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
149 San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Bennett, 76 Tex. 151, 13 S.W. 319 (1890); Noel v.
Denman, 76 Tex. 306, 13 S.W. 318 (1890); International & G.N.R.R. v. McVey, 102
S.W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.
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provided other misconduct does not vitiate the verdict.' An un-
authorized separation may subject a juror to contempt action, how-
ever.15 Although the authorized release of the jurors by the bailiff
was ruled to be harmless,"s" the judge should direct the separation.
Jurors should always deliberate as a body. It is error for the mem-
bers of the jury to discuss the case, even with other jurors, outside
the presence of the entire panel.'" Although separation itself is
seldom grounds for reversal, many prejudicial forms of misconduct
may occur during the separation period."' It was reversible error for
a foreman to separate himself from the jury for the purpose of read-
ing a deposition and reporting its content to the remainder of the
jury.'" As previously indicated, a juror should not be allowed to
separate himself from the other jurors to engage in a private con-
ference with the judge.'6 It was once necessary to obtain the parties'
consent in order to permit jury separation prior to the return of the
verdict; 1 7 however, it is now a matter of judicial discretion.
H. Signing The Verdict
All jury verdicts should be signed by the foreman."' The signature
requirement, however, is directory only and is not essential to the
'"Burns v. Paine, 8 Tex. 159 (1852); Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89 (1849); Gulf
C. & S.F. Ry. v. Lockhart, 18 S.W. 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
s Burns v. Paine, supra note 150; Edrington v. Kiger, supra note 150.
'"Prescott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 129 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
error dism.
1"Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gillette, 125 Tex. 563, 83 S.W.2d 307 (1935); Cloudt v.
Hutcherson, 175 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.; 53 Am. Jur. Trial §5 899,
906, 907 (1945). Several jurors' unauthorized presence in another room for about twenty-
five minutes during deliberation, though present during discussion and at the time the issues
were voted upon, was ruled not to be harmful. Clark v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 226
S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. ts.r.e.
' Hines v. Parry, 238 S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
155 Tian v. Warren, 271 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
'5 See notes 92-102 supra and accompanying text.
"'For a statement of the old rule, see Hancock v. Winans, 20 Tex. 320 (1857);
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 536, 560 (1930); 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 865 (1945); 41-B Tex. Jur.
Trial - Civil Cases S 337 (1953). Today, the jury may separate without the express consent
of the parties (Tex. R. Civ. P. 282); in fact, the exercise of the court's discretion in per-
mitting a jury to separate will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly shown that
the party complaining has been injured thereby. Railway Co. v. Bennett, 76 Tex. 151, 13
S.W. 319 (1890); Noel v. Denman, 76 Tex. 306, 13 S.W. 318 (1890).
15'Tex. R. Civ. P. 290:
A verdict is a written declaration by a jury of its decision, comprehending the
whole or all the issues submitted to the jury, and shall be either a general or
special verdict, as directed, which shall be signed by the foreman of the jury.
A general verdict is one whereby the jury pronounces generally in favor of
one or more parties to the suit upon all of the issues submitted to it. A special
verdict is one wherein the jury finds the facts only on issues made up and sub-
mitted to them under the direction of the court.
A special verdict shall, as between the parties, be conclusive as to the facts
found.
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validity of the verdict.1 ' The absence of the signature may require
the production of evidence that the verdict was in fact received as a
verdict.' In the case of an incomplete verdict, the signature is some
evidence that the jury intended the answers as their verdict.1 During
a trial of a civil case in the district court, should one or more jurors
die or become disabled, those remaining may render and return a
verdict provided at least nine jurors join therein.' In such a case,
the verdict should be signed by all the jurors.'
I. Receiving The Verdict
When the jury agree upon the verdict, they shall be brought into court
by the proper officer, and they shall deliver their verdict to the clerk;
and if they state that they have agreed, the verdict shall be read aloud
by the clerk. If in proper form, and no juror dissent therefrom, and
neither party requests a poll of the jury, the verdict shall be entered
upon the minutes of the court.'"
The verdict must be returned in open court in the presence of the
entire jury." The reception of the verdict requires clarity and strict
adherence to the law. Particularly is this important if the verdict
does not completely answer the charge. These steps are suggested:
(1) When the bailiff informs the court that the jury is ready to
report, all the lawyers should be notified. Although a verdict may be
received in their absence,"' it is not good practice to do so.
(2) With all jurors present and in the box, the court should say
'"Barker v. Weingarten Riverside Co., 232 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error
ref. n.v.e.; Patterson v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 77 S.W.2d 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error
dism.; Schlofman v. Bear Canon Coal Co.. 77 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Laybourn
v. Bray & Shifflet, 214 S.W. 630 (Tex. Civ. Ap. 1919) error ref.; Aycock v. Paraffine Oil
Co., 210 S.W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); City of Henderson v. Fields. 194 S.W. 1003
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.; Barker v. Ash, 194 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. J917)
error ref.; Calvin v. Ned, 191 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error dism.; Crosby v.
Stevens, 184 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error dism.; Quanah, A. & P. Ry. v. R.D.
Jones Lumber Co., 178 S.W. 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) error ref.; 53 Am. Jur. Trial
1034 (1945).
'"Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 281 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)"
Barker v. Weingarten Riverside Co., supra note 159; 41-B Tex. Jur. Trial- Civil Cases S
343 (1953).
161 Ibid.
161 Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. R. Civ. P. 292.
'"Ibid. The rule was taken from an earlier statute (Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 2204
(1926)) under which the requirement for signatures of the jurors was declared directory.
Tram Lumber Co. v. Hancock, 70 Tex. 312, 7 S.W. 724 (1888); Quanah & A. & P. Ry. v.
R.D. Jones Lumber Co., 178 S.W. 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) error ref.
'"Tex. R. Civ. P. 293.
16'Wheeler v. Oxford, 321 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Whitlow v. Moore, 1
White & Willson S 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1883).
'"Rodriguez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 35 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930);
Lawrence v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co., 237 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.
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in substance, "Members of the jury, speaking through your foreman,
the court wishes to inquire whether you have been able to answer the
questions the court has asked you in the charge?"
(3) Upon an affirmative answer, the judge should ask the bailiff
or clerk to hand him the verdict. Although the rule'. states that the
clerk shall read the verdict aloud, it is not unusual for the judge him-
self to read it. Whoever reads the verdict should also read the name
of the foreman who signed it.
(4) After the verdict is read, the judge should examine it care-
fully to see that it is complete, non-conflicting, non-defective, and
signed by the foreman.
(5) The judge should ask counsel if they wish to examine the
verdict; if so, this examination should be made in the court room in
the presence of the jury. If some problem is present, the court and
counsel should confer, either in chambers or at the bench, out of the
jury's hearing.
(6) If the verdict is incomplete because the jurors have been un-
able to agree upon the answers to some of the issues, it becomes the
duty of the judge, if he regards the jury as hopelessly hung, to in-
struct them in writing to answer such questions as they are able to
answer and to sign and return their verdict.'" The fact that certain
immaterial and uncontrolling issues were not answered does not
necessarily render the judgment void."' If sufficient questions to
support a judgment are answered and returned as the jury verdict,
a mistrial will be averted.'" If the verdict contains conflicts between
the answers to certain special issues, the court should instruct the
jury to return to the jury room to deliberate further instead of ac-
cepting the verdict.'
1
6 TTex. R. Civ. P. 293.
sSOColls v. Price's Creameries, Inc., 244 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
n.r.e.
leg Williams v. Patterson, 170 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Oil Country Pipe &
Supply Co. v. Carter, 143 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism.
" 'Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberg, 184 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); 41-B Tex.
Jur. Trial-Civil Cases §§ 575-79 (1953).
171 Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 138 Tex. 523, 161 S.W.2d 484 (1942); Lowrance
v. Kenworthy, 138 Tex. 132, 157 S.W.2d 879 (1942); A.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 136
Tex. 89, 148 S.W.2d 392 (1941); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 350 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1961); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Childress, 349 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Newman, 348 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, - Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 871 (1962); Barnett v.
Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.; Meadolake Foods v.
Estes, 218 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e., 148 Tex. 13, 219 S.W.2d
441 (1949); Tex. R. Civ. P. 295.
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(7) Either party has the right to test the unanimity of the jury
verdict by requesting a poll."'
(8) If the answers to the questions appear to be complete, free of
conflicts, not defective, signed by the foreman, and unanimous, the
judge should audibly announce, "The verdict is received as the
verdict of the jury." Up to the time of the announcement that the
verdict is received, any juror may withdraw his verdict; however,
when the verdict is received, it acquires the finality of an official
act,"" and a mandamus will lie to compel the entry of a judgment
on the verdict."7
J. Discharge of Jury
Jurors should be discharged (a) when they cannot agree and
both parties consent to their discharge or when they have been
kept together for such time as to render it improbable that they
can agree, (b) when in the opinion of the court any calamity or
accident may require it, (c) when sickness or other cause has re-
duced their number below the number constituting the jury in such
court, (d) when some event occurs that renders a fair trial im-
probable, or (e) when court finally adjourns before the jury agrees
upon a verdict.'75 How long and under what circumstances a jury
should be held together for further deliberations is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge."7
The judge may exercise his discretion in discharging a juror, and
he apparently may do so even without a judicial hearing in advance
of the discharge.' Courts have discharged jurors because of mental
disability,7" drunkenness,7 ' physical disability,' 0 serious illness in
17'Tex. R. Civ. P. 294:
Either party shall have the right to have the jury polled. When a jury is
polled, this is done by reading once to the jury collectively the general verdict,
or the special issues and answers thereto consecutively, and then calling the
name of each juror separately and asking him if it is his verdict. If any juror
answers in the negative, the jury shall be retired for further deliberation.
17i State v. Finch, 349 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); DeBusk v. Cadenhead, 346
S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Wheeler v. Oxford, 321 S.W.2d 188
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Lee v. Galbreath, 234 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2355 (3d ed. 1940); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 487 (1955).
14 State v. Finch, 349 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
175 Tex. R. Civ. P. 289.
".. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Barber, 209 S.W. 394 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919) (the trial
court abused its discretion); King v. Wise, 1 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Annot.,
164 A.L.R. 1265 (1946); 41-B Tex. Jur. Trial-Civil Cases 5 305 (1953).
177 Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.;
Schebesta v. Stewart, 37 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.; Routledge v.
Elmendorf, 116 S.W. 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref.; 18 Texas L. Rev. 511 (1940).
.. Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, supra note 177; Sunset Wood Co. v. Broadnax, 136
S.W. 487 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) error ref.
17'Routledge v. Elmendorf, 116 S.W. 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref.
'"0 Schebesta v. Stewart, 37 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error dism.
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the juror's family, "1' certain types of misconduct,' or disqualifica-
tion.' There is no error if a juror is excused by consent.'
The entire jury should be discharged if an event occurs during
trial which renders a fair trial improbable.'' The rule has been ap-
plied if the jury has been tampered with.' Furthermore, if the sub-
ject of insurance is injected improperly into the trial, the jury may
be discharged.' If a juror conceals information on voir dire for
which he is later disqualified, this may require the judge to discharge
the entire jury."'
After the jurors are discharged, they may not reassemble for the
purpose of rewriting or clarifying their charge. 8' For reasons of
public policy, a verdict should not be corrected by jurors after they
have mingled with the public, the parties, and their friends. The
remedy, even for a unanimous clerical mistake of the jury, is a new
trial."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The principles here stated represent the minimum information that
all judges and lawyers should know. Jurors arrive in court without
information about most of these rules, and it is important that they
see justice administered intelligently. Aside from the case which a
jury may witness and judge, there is a more transcending trial func-
tion. Forsythe, in commenting upon M. de Tocqueville's estimate of
a jury trial, has recorded some of those lessons which jurors learn.
The jury, he continues, and especially the civil jury, serves to
imbue the minds of the citizens of a county with a part of the
181 Barker v. Ash, 194 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.; cf. Houston & T.C.
Ry. v. Waller, 56 Tex. 331 (1882), holding that a juror is not disabled by mere distress
of mind caused by information of illness of his family.
' State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 187 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), petition
for appeal denied, 194 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App, 1946).
"'Mundine v. Pauls, 66 S.W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902); cf. Zarate v. Villareal, 155
S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref. Jurors may be examined further concerning
their possible disqualification even after they are accepted for a case. Galveston, H. & S.A.
R.R. v. Paschall, 92 S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) error ref.
"'Tram Lumber Co. v. Hancock, 70 Tex. 312, 7 S.W. 724 (1888).
"ss41-B Tex. Jur. Trial-Civil Cases § 305 (1953).
's' Allala v. A.N. Tandy & Sons, 59 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), aff'd, 127 Tex.
148, 92 S.W.2d 227 (1936); Sunset Wood Co. v. Broadnax, 136 S.W. 487 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911) error ref.
187 At least it has been held not to be error to refuse a request for discharge if the con-
nection of the insurance company with the case did not appear. Levy v. Rogers, 75 S.W.2d
304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error dism.
.S Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Cossman, 212 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
error ref. n.r.e.
"'Salinas v. Stillman, 25 Tex. 12 (1860); Crosby County Cattle Co. v. McDermett,
281 S.W. 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Ellis v. State, 11 S.W. 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1889).
"
0 Caylat v. Houston, E. & W.T.R.R., 113 Tex. 131, 252 S.W. 478 (1923); Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932); Bozalina v. Burton
& Co., 152 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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qualities and character of a judge, and this is the best mode of pre-
paring them for freedom. It spreads amongst all classes a respect for
the decision of the law; it teaches them the practice of equitable
dealing. Each man in judging his neighbor thinks that he may be also
judged in his turn. This is in an especial manner true of the civil jury;
for although hardly any one fears lest he may become the object of a
criminal prosecution, everybody may be engaged in a lawsuit. It
teaches every man not to shirk from the responsibility attaching to
his own acts; and this gives a manly character, without which there
is no political virtue. It clothes every citizen with a kind of magisterial
office; it makes all feel that they have duties to fulfill toward society,
and that they have a part in its government; it forces men to occupy
themselves with something else than their own affairs, and thus combats
that individual selfishness, which is, as it were, the rust of the com-
munity.
